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Abstract
In this paper the cone of convex cooperative fuzzy games is
studied. As in the classical case of convex crisp games, these
games have a large core and the fuzzy Shapley value is the barycen-
ter of the core. Surprisingly, the core and the Weber set coincide
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1as in the classical case but the coincidence of these sets for a fuzzy
game does not imply automatically convexity as in the crisp case.
Participation monotonic allocation schemes (pamas) are intro-
duced and it turns out that each core element of a convex fuzzy
game is pamas−extendable.
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1 Introduction
The basis of cooperative game theory was laid in the book of von Neumann
and Morgenstern (1944). Since then several solution concepts for cooperative
games have been proposed and several interesting subclasses of games have
been introduced.
A highly interesting class of cooperative games is the class of convex games
introduced by Shapley (1971). For this cone of games many solution concepts
behave nicely and much is known about their interrelations. Convex games
also arise naturally in connection with economic situations as sequencing
(Curiel et al., 1989), bankruptcy (Curiel et al., 1988), and ﬁnancing of public
goods. Airport fee problems are related with concave games (Littlechild and
Owen, 1973).
The theory of cooperative fuzzy games started with work of Aubin (1974,
1981) where the notions of fuzzy game and the core of a fuzzy game are
introduced. In the meantime many solution concepts have been developed
(cf. Butnariu, 1978; Butnariu and Klement, 1993; Molina and Tejada, 2002;
Nishizaki and Sakawa, 2001; Sakawa and Nishizaki, 1994; Tsurumi et al.,
22001).
The purpose of this paper is on one hand to present a detailed character-
ization of the class of convex fuzzy games, and on the other hand to study
the solution concept of participation monotonic allocation scheme (pamas)
for fuzzy games in connection with some solution concepts for these games.
It turns out that convex fuzzy games form a convex subcone of the cone of
cooperative fuzzy games with a pamas.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Sections 2 and 3 are introduc-
tory; they provide the necessary notions and facts for crisp games and fuzzy
games, respectively. Section 4 deals with convex fuzzy games. Characteriz-
ing properties are discussed. Special attention is paid to the core and some
other related solution concepts for convex games. In Section 5 we introduce
participation monotonic allocation schemes for fuzzy games and prove that
each core element of a convex fuzzy game can be extended to such a scheme.
Section 6 concludes with some ﬁnal remarks.
2 Cooperative crisp games
In the following N is a ﬁnite set of players (often N = {1,2,...,n})a n d2N is
the family of 2|N| crisp subsets of N. A (crisp) cooperative game with player
set N is a map v :2 N → < with v(∅)=0 .F o r S ∈ 2N, v(S) is called the
worth of coalition S and it is interpreted as the amount of money (utility)
the coalition can obtain, when the players in S work together.
The class of crisp games with player set N is denoted by GN.W er e c a l l
now some well−known facts from the theory of cooperative crisp games. The
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Let Π(N) be the set of linear orderings of N.T h e nf o re a c hv ∈ GN and
each σ ∈ Π(N) the marginal vector mσ(v) ∈ <N is deﬁned as follows: the
i−th coordinate mσ
i (v) of mσ(v) is equal to
v({σ(1),σ(2),...,σ(k)}) − v({σ(1),σ(2),...,σ(k − 1)}) if i = σ(k).
So mσ
i (v) is the marginal contribution of i = σ(k) entering the coalition
{σ(1),σ(2),...,σ(k − 1)} of predecessors of i in the order σ.




and the Weber set W(v) (Weber, 1988) is the convex hull of the marginal
vectors conv {mσ(v) | σ ∈ Π(N)}.














consisting of eﬃcient vectors with sum of the coordinates equal to v(N)




It is well−known (Weber, 1988) that C(v) ⊂ W(v) for each game v ∈ GN.
Further, for convex games the Shapley value is the barycenter of the core
(i.e. the average of the n! marginal vectors which are precisely the extreme
points of the core).
Here a game v ∈ GN is called convex if it satisﬁes one of the following
equivalent conditions (cf. Shapley, 1971; Ichiishi, 1981; Curiel, 1997):
4Supermodularity property:f o re a c hS,T ∈ 2N
v(S ∪ T)+v(S ∩ T) ≥ v(S)+v(T); (1)
Increasing marginal contribution property for players:f o r e a c h S,T ∈ 2N
with S ⊂ T and for each i ∈ N \ T
v(S ∪ {i}) − v(S) ≤ v(T ∪ {i}) − v(T); (2)
Increasing marginal contribution property for coalitions:f o re a c hS,T,U ∈
2N with S ⊂ T ⊂ N \ U
v(S ∪ U) − v(S) ≤ v(T ∪ U) − v(T); (3)
Stable marginal vector property:f o re a c hσ ∈ Π(N)
the marginal vector m
σ(v) is a core element. (4)
Note that (4) and the result of Weber (1988) imply that C(v)=W(v) for
convex crisp games.
3 Cooperative fuzzy games
Given a ﬁnite set N of players, a fuzzy coalition is a vector s ∈ [0,1]
N.T h e
i−th coordinate si of s is called the participation level of player i in the
fuzzy coalition s. Instead of [0,1]
N we will also write FN for the set of fuzzy
coalitions. A crisp coalition S ∈ 2N corresponds in a canonical way with the
fuzzy coalition eS,w h e r eeS ∈ FN is the vector with
¡
eS¢
i =1if i ∈ S,a n d
¡
eS¢
i =0if i ∈ N \ S. The fuzzy coalition eS corresponds to the situation
where the players in S fully cooperate (i.e. with participation level 1)a n d
the players outside S are not involved at all (i.e. they have participation
5level 0). We denote by ei the fuzzy coalition corresponding to the crisp
coalition S = {i} (and also the i−th standard basis vector in <N). The
fuzzy coalition eN is called the grand coalition, and the fuzzy coalition (the
n−dimensional vector) (0,0,...,0) corresponds to the empty crisp coalition.
We can identify the fuzzy coalitions with points in the hypercube [0,1]
N and
the crisp coalitions with the 2|N| extreme points (vertices) of this hypercube.
A fuzzy game with player set N is a map v : FN → < with the property
v(0) = 0.T h em a pv assigns to each fuzzy coalition a number, telling what
such a coalition can achieve in cooperation. In the following the set of fuzzy
games with player set N will be denoted by FG N.N o t e t h a t FG N is an
inﬁnite dimensional linear space.
Of course, the theory of cooperative crisp games is an inspiration source
for the development of the theory of cooperative fuzzy games. Here operators
from FG N → GN and from GN → FG N play a role (cf. Owen, 1972; Weiß,
1998). In the following we consider only the multilinear operator ml : GN →
FG N (Owen, 1972) and the crisp operator cr : FG N → GN. Here for a crisp













v(S),f o re a c hs ∈ F
N.
For a fuzzy game v ∈ FG N,t h ec r i s pg a m ecr(v) ∈ GN is given by
cr(v)(S)=v(eS) for each S ∈ 2N.
Example 1 For the crisp unanimity game uT the multilinear extension is
given by ml(uT)(s)=
Q
i∈T si (cf. Weiß, 1998) and cr(ml(uT)) = uT.N o t e
that for the games v,w ∈ FG {1,2},w h e r ev(s1,s 2)=s1 (s2)
2 and w(s1,s 2)=
s1
√
s2 for each s ∈ F{1,2},w eh a v ecr(v)=cr(w).
6In general the composition cr ◦ ml : GN → GN is the identity map on
GN.B u tml ◦cr : FG N → FG N is not the identity map on FG N if |N| ≥ 2.















So x ∈ C(v) can be seen as a distribution of the value of the grand
coalition eN, where for each fuzzy coalition s, the total payoﬀ is not smaller
than v(s),i fe a c hp l a y e ri ∈ N with participation level si is paid sixi.
Remark 1 The core C(cr(v)) of the crisp game corresponding to v includes
C(v):C(v) ⊂ C(cr(v)). Later we will see that for convex fuzzy games the
two cores coincide.
Clearly, the core C(v) of a fuzzy game v is a closed convex subset of <N
for each v ∈ FG N.O fc o u r s e ,t h ec o r em a yb ee m p t ya sE x a m p l e3s h o w s
or can consist of one point as in Example 2.
Example 2 Consider the fuzzy three−person game v with v(s1,s 2,s 3)=
min{s1 + s2,s 3} for each s =( s1,s 2,s 3) ∈ F{1,2,3}. One can think of a situ-
ation where players 1, 2, 3 have one unit of goods A, A and B, respectively,
where A and B are complementary goods, and where combining a fraction α
of a unit of A and of B leads to a gain α. Then in the grand coalition good
B is scarce which is reﬂected in the fact that the core consists of one point
(0,0,1), corresponding to the situation where all gains go to player 3 who
possesses the scarce good.









2) =1if s1 ≥ 1






























=1 , which is impossible.
Let us now introduce for a fuzzy game v the marginal vectors mσ(v) for
each σ ∈ Π(N),t h efuzzy Shapley value φ(v) and the fuzzy Weber set W(v)
as follows:





(iii) W(v)=conv {mσ(v) | σ ∈ Π(N)}.
Note that φ(v)=φ(cr(v)), W(v)=W(cr(v)). Note further that for
i = σ(k),t h ei−th coordinate mσ


















One can identify a σ ∈ Π(N) with an n−step walk along the edges of
the hypercube of fuzzy coalitions starting in 0 and ending in eN by passing
the vertices eσ(1),e σ(1) + eσ(2),...,
Pn−1
r=1 eσ(r).T h ev e c t o rmσ(v) records the
changes in value from vertex to vertex.
The result of Weber (1988) that the core of a crisp game is included in
the Weber set of the game can be extended for fuzzy games as we see in
Proposition 1 Let v ∈ FG N.T h e nC(v) ⊂ W(v).
Proof. A c c o r d i n gt oR e m a r k1w eh a v eC(v) ⊂ C(cr(v)). Weber proved
that C(cr(v)) ⊂ W(cr(v)).S i n c eW(cr(v)) = W(v) we obtain C(v) ⊂ W(v).
8Inspired by Owen (1972) one can deﬁne the diagonal value δ(v) for a
C1−fuzzy game (i.e. a game v which is diﬀerentiable with continuous deriva-





where Di is the partial derivative of v with respect to the i−th coordinate.
Owen (1972) proved that for each crisp game v ∈ GN :
φi(v)=δi(ml(v)) for each i ∈ N.
T h en e x te x a m p l es h o w st h a tf o raf u z z yg a m ev, δ(v) and φ(cr(v)) may
diﬀer.
Example 4 Let v ∈ FG {1,2} with v(s1,s 2)=s1(s2)2 for (s1,s 2) ∈ F{1,2}.
Then
m
(1,2) =( v(1,0) − v(0,0),v(1,1) − v(1,0)) = (0,1),
m



















































94 The cone of convex fuzzy games
Let N be a ﬁnite set and let v :[ 0 ,1]
N → < be a real−valued function on
[0,1]
N.T h e n
(i) v is called a supermodular function on [0,1]
N if
v(s ∨ t)+v(s ∧ t) ≥ v(s)+v(t) for all s,t ∈ [0,1]
N ,( 5 )
where s ∨ t and s ∧ t are those elements of [0,1]
N with the i−th coordinate
equal to max{si,t i} and min{si,t i}, respectively;
(ii) v is called a coordinate−wise convex function if for each i ∈ N and
each s−i ∈ [0,1]
N\{i} the function gs−i :[ 0 ,1] → < with gs−i(t)=v(s−i k t) is
a convex function. Here (s−i k t) is the element in [0,1]
N with (s−i k t)j = sj
for each j ∈ N \{ i} and (s−i k t)i = t.
Now we are ready for
Deﬁnition 1 Let v ∈ FG N.T h e n v is called a convex fuzzy game if
the function v :[ 0 ,1]
N → < is a supermodular and a coordinate-wise convex
function on [0,1]
N.
Remark 2 Convex fuzzy games form a convex cone.
Remark 3 For a weaker deﬁnition of a convex fuzzy game see Tsurumi et
al. (2001), who use only the supermodularity property.
Some properties of convex fuzzy games are given in the next propositions.
Proposition 2 Suppose v ∈ FG N is a convex game. Then the game cr(v)
is a convex crisp game.
10Proof. We will prove that cr(v) satisﬁes the supermodularity property
(1). Take S,T ∈ 2N a n da p p l yt h es u p e r m o d u l a r i t yp r o p e r t y( 5 )w i t h
eS,e T,e S∪T,e S∩T in the roles of s,t,s ∨ t,s ∧ t, respectively, and we obtain
cr(v)(S ∪ T)+cr(v)(S ∩ T) ≥ cr(v)(S)+cr(v)(T).
The next property for convex fuzzy games is related with the increasing
marginal contribution property (2) for players in crisp games. It states that
a level increase of a player in a fuzzy coalition has more beneﬁcial eﬀect in a
larger coalition than in a smaller coalition.
Proposition 3 Let v ∈ FG N be a convex game. Let s1,s 2 ∈ FN with
s1 ≤ s2 and let ε ∈ <+ with 0 ≤ ε ≤ 1 − s2




















Proof. Suppose N = {1,2,...,n}.D e ﬁne the fuzzy coalitions c0,c 1,c 2,...,c n
by c0 = s1,a n dck = ck−1 +( s2
k − s1
k)ek for k ∈ {1,2,...,n}.T h e ncn = s2.
























Note that (Ii) follows from the coordinate−wise convexity of v and
¡
Ik¢
for k 6= i, from the supermodularity property (5) with ck−1 + εei in the role
of s and ck i nt h er o l eo ft.T h e ns ∨ t = ck + εei, s ∧ t = ck−1.
Also an analogue of the increasing marginal contribution property for
coalitions (3) holds as we see in
11Proposition 4 Let v ∈ FG N be a convex game. Let s,t ∈ FN and z ∈ <N
+
such that s ≤ t ≤ t + z ≤ eN.T h e n
v(s + z) − v(s) ≤ v(t + z) − v(t). (7)
Proof. For each k ∈ {1,2,...,n} it follows from Proposition 3 (with
s +
Pk−1
r=1 zrer i nt h er o l eo fs1, t +
Pk−1
r=1 zrer i nt h er o l eo fs2, k in the role


































Adding these n inequalities yields the inequality (7).
Important is the following proposition.
Proposition 5 Let v ∈ FG N be a convex game. Let s1,s 2 ∈ FN with
s1 ≤ s2 and let ε1,ε2 ∈ <++ with s1
i +ε1 ≤ s2




























Proof. From Proposition 3 (with s1, (s2 +( s1
i − s2
i)ei) and ε1 in the roles














































Further, from the coordinate−wise convexity (by noting that s2






















































12resulting in the desired inequality.
We will call inequality (8) in Proposition 5 the increasing average marginal
return property (IAMR−property). It expresses the fact that for a convex
game an increase in participation level of any player in a smaller coalition
yields per unit of level less than an increase in a bigger coalition under the
condition that the reached level of participation in the ﬁrst case is still not
bigger than the reached level in the second case. The IAMR−property turns
out to be crucial for convex fuzzy games as we see in Theorem 6.
Theorem 6 Let v ∈ FG N. Then the following assertions are equivalent:
(i) v is a convex game;
(ii) v satisﬁes the increasing average marginal return property (IAMR−property).
Proof. We know from Proposition 5 that a convex game satisﬁes the
IAMR−property. On the other hand it is clear that the IAMR−property
implies the coordinate−wise convexity property. Hence, we only have to
prove that the IAMR−property implies the supermodularity property. So,
given s,t ∈ FN we have to prove that the supermodularity inequality (5)
holds.
Let P = {i ∈ N | ti <s i}.I fP = ∅, then (5) follows from the fact that
s ∨ t = t,s ∧ t = s.F o r P 6= ∅, arrange the elements of P in a sequence
σ(1),σ(2),...,σ(p),w h e r ep = |P|,a n dp u tεσ(k) = sσ(k) − tσ(k) > 0 for
k ∈ {1,2,...,p}.N o t et h a ti nt h i sc a s e




















































From these equalities the supermodularity inequality (5) follows because
the IAMR−property implies for each r ∈ {1,2,...,p} :
v
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As we see in the following theorem the stable marginal vector property (4)
also holds for convex fuzzy games and the Weber set coincides with the core.
So the core is large; moreover it coincides with the core of the corresponding
crisp game.
Theorem 7 Let v ∈ FG N be a convex game. Then
(i) mσ(v) ∈ C(v) for each σ ∈ Π(N);
(ii) C(v)=W(v);
(iii) C(v)=C(cr(v)).































































where the inequality follows by applying n times Proposition 5. Hence
mσ(v) ∈ C(v) for each σ ∈ Π(N).
(ii) From assertion (i)a n dt h ec o n v e x i t yo ft h ec o r ew eo b t a i nW(v)=
conv{mσ(v) | σ ∈ Π(N)} ⊂ C(v). The reverse inclusion follows from Propo-
sition 1.
(iii)S i n c ecr(v) is a convex crisp game by Proposition 2, we have C(cr(v)) =
W(cr(v)),a n dW(cr(v)) = W(v)=C(v) by (ii).
It follows from Theorem 7 that φ(v) has a central position in the core if
v is a convex fuzzy game. For crisp games it holds that a game v is convex
if and only if C(v)=W(v) (Ichiishi, 1981). For fuzzy games the implication
is only in one direction. Example 5 gives a game which is not convex and
where the core and the Weber set coincide.













=0 .T h e nv is not a convex game, but C(v)=
W(v)=conv {(0,1),(1,0)}.
Example 6 Let us consider one−person fuzzy games v :[ 0 ,1] → <.T h e nv
is a convex game iﬀ v is a convex function. Further v has a non−empty core
C(v)={v(1)} iﬀ v(s) ≤ sv(1) for each s ∈ [0,1],a n da l w a y sC(v)=W(v)
if C(v) 6= ∅.
Example 7 (A public good game) Suppose n players want to create a facility
for joint use. The cost of the facility depends on the sum of the participation
levels of the players and it is described by k(
Pn
i=1 si),w h e r ek is a con-
tinuous monotonic increasing function on [0,n],w i t hk(0) = 0,a n dw h e r e
s1,s 2,...,s n ∈ [0,1] are the participation levels of the players. The gain of
15a player i with participation level si is given by gi(si),w h e r egi :[ 0 ,1] → <
is a continuous monotone increasing function with gi(0) = 0. This situation
l e a d st oaf u z z yg a m ev ∈ FG N where v(s)=
Pn
i=1 gi(si) − k(
Pn
i=1 si) for
each s ∈ FN. In case the functions g1,g 2,...,g n and −k are convex the fuzzy
game v is a convex game.
For fuzzy games the core is a superadditive solution, i.e.
C(v + w) ⊃ C(v)+C(w) for all v,w ∈ FG
N
and the fuzzy games with a non−empty core form a cone.
For convex fuzzy games the core turns out to be an additive correspon-
dence as we see in
Proposition 8 T h ec o r eo fac o n v e xf u z z yg a m ea n dt h ef u z z yS h a p l e yv a l u e
are additive solutions.
Proof. Let v,w be convex fuzzy games. Then
C(v + w)=C(cr(v + w)) =
C(cr(v)+cr(w)) = C(cr(v)) + C(cr(w)) = C(v)+C(w),
where the ﬁrst equality follows from Theorem 7 (iii) and the third equality
follows from the additivity of the core for convex crisp games (cf. Brânzei
and Tijs, 2001). Further from φ(v)=φ(cr(v)) and the additivity of the
Shapley value for convex crisp games it follows that φ(v+w)=φ(v)+φ(w).
Now we deﬁne fuzzy unanimity games and study some properties of these
games. In the theory of cooperative crisp games unanimity games play an
important role. Crisp unanimity games are all convex and have therefore a
non−empty core.
16For t ∈ FN,w ed e n o t eb yut t h es i m p l ef u z z yg a m ed e ﬁned by ut(s)=1if
s ≥ t and ut(s)=0otherwise. We call this game the unanimity game based
on t : a fuzzy coalition s is winning if the participation levels of s exceed
weakly the corresponding participation levels of t; otherwise the coalition is
losing, i.e. has value zero.
Note that for the unanimity game ut, the corresponding crisp game cr(ut)
is equal to uT,w h e r euT is the crisp unanimity game based on T = supp(t)=
{i ∈ N | ti > 0}.
Conversely, ml(uT) is for no T ∈ 2NÂ{∅} a fuzzy unanimity game be-
cause ml(uT) has a continuum of values: ml(uT)(s)=
Q
i∈T si for each
s ∈ FN.
The next proposition shows that for an unanimity game ut the gain
1=ut(eN) in a core element is divided among the members of t with full
participation levels. Further only unanimity games ut, where all the partici-
pation levels of the players in t are 0 or 1 are convex.
Proposition 9 Let ut be the unanimity game based on the fuzzy coalition t.
Then
(i) The core C(ut) is non-empty iﬀ tk =1for some k ∈ N.I nf a c tt h ec o r e
C(ut) equals conv
©
ek | k ∈ N,tk =1
ª
.
(ii) The game ut is convex iﬀ t = eT for some T ∈ 2N \{ ∅}.
Proof. (i)I ftk =1for some k ∈ N,t h e nek ∈ C(ut).T h e r e f o r e ,
conv
©
ek | k ∈ N,tk =1
ª
⊂ C(ut).





1=ut(t), xi ≥ ut(ei) ≥ 0 for each i ∈ N.S ox ≥ 0,
Pn
i=1 xi(1−ti) ≤ 0,w h i c h
implies that xi(1 − ti)=0for all i ∈ N.H e n c esupp(x) ⊂ {i ∈ N | ti =1 },
and, consequently x ∈ conv
©
ek | k ∈ N,tk =1
ª
.
So C(ut) ⊂ conv
©
ek | k ∈ N,tk =1
ª
.
17(ii) Suppose t 6= eT for some T ∈ 2N\{∅}. Then there is a k ∈ N such that
ε =m i n{tk,1 − tk} > 0 and 0=ut(t+εek)−ut(t) <u t(t)−ut(t−εek)=1 ,
implying that ut is not convex.
Conversely, suppose that t = eT for some T ∈ 2N \{ ∅}.T h e nw es h o w
that ut has the supermodularity property and the coordinate−wise convexity
property. Take s and k in FN. We can distinguish three cases.
(1) ut(s ∨ k)+ut(s ∧ k)=2 .T h e n ut(s ∧ k)=1 ,s out(s)+ut(k) ≥
2ut(s ∧ k)=2 , ut(s)+ut(k)=2 .
(2) ut(s ∨ k)+ut(s ∧ k)=0 .T h e n ut(s ∨ k)=0 ,s out(s)+ut(k) ≤
2ut(s ∨ k)=0 , ut(s)+ut(k)=0 .
(3) ut(s ∨ k)+ut(s ∧ k)=1 .T h e n ut(s ∨ k)=1 ,u t(s ∧ k)=0and,
consequently, at least one of the numbers ut(s) and ut(k) equals 0.S out(s)+
ut(k) ≤ 1.
Hence, the supermodularity property holds for ueT.
Secondly, to prove the coordinate−wise convexity of ueT,n o t et h a ta l l
functions gs−i in the deﬁnition of coordinate−wise convexity are convex be-
cause they are either constant with value 0 or with value 1,o rt h e yh a v e
value 0 on [0,1) and value 1 in 1.S oueT is a convex game.
5 Participation monotonic allocation schemes
Inspired by Sprumont (1990) (see also Hokari, 2000), who considers the inter-
esting notion of population monotonic allocation scheme (pmas) for coopera-
tive crisp games, we introduce here for fuzzy games the notion of participation
monotonic allocation scheme (pamas). In a pmas for the crisp game and for
each crisp subgame there is given a core element and the core elements are
related via a monotonicity condition. To be more precise, a pmas for a crisp
18game v :2 N → < is an allocation scheme [aS,i]S∈2N\{∅},i∈S such that:
(i) (aS,i)i∈S ∈ C(vS) for each S ∈ 2N \{ ∅},w h e r evS is the subgame
corresponding to S,i . e .vS :2 S → < is the restriction of v :2 N → < to 2S;
(ii) aS,i ≤ aT,i for all S,T ∈ 2N \{ ∅} with S ⊂ T and i ∈ S.
In our approach the role of subgames of a crisp game will be taken over
by restricted games of a fuzzy game.
Deﬁnition 2 Let v ∈ FG N and t ∈ FN.T h e nt h et−restricted game of
v is the game vt : FN → < given by vt(s)=( t∗s) for all s ∈ FN.H e r et∗s
is the coordinate-wise product of t and s,s o(t ∗ s)i = tisi.
Remark 4 When t = eT then vt(s)=v(eT ∗ s)=v(
P
i∈T siei) for each
s ∈ FN,a n df o rs = eS we obtain vt(eS)=v(eS∩T). This implies that
the restriction of cr(veT):2 N → < to 2T is the subgame of cr(v) on the
player set T.M o r e o v e r ,i nveT each player i ∈ N \ T i saz e r op l a y e r ,i . e .
v(s + εei)=v(s) for all s ∈ FN and for all ε ∈ [0,1 − si].
Remark 5 Note that for each core element x ∈ C(vt) we have xi =0for
each i/ ∈ supp(t). This follows from
0=v(0) = vt(e









where we use that i/ ∈ supp(t) in the second and last equality, and that x ∈
C(vt) in the two inequalities.
Remark 6 If v ∈ FG N is a convex game, then also vt is a convex game for
each t ∈ FN. This is the fuzzy analogue of the fact that subgames of crisp
convex games are convex.
19Deﬁnition 3 Let v ∈ FG N.As c h e m e[at,i]t∈FN,i∈N is called a participa-
tion monotonic allocation scheme (pamas)i f
(i) (at,i)i∈N ∈ C(vt) for each t ∈ FN (stability condition);
(ii) t
−1
i at,i ≥ s
−1
i as,i for each s,t ∈ FN with s ≤ t and each i ∈ supp(s)
(participation monotonicity condition).
Remark 7 Note that such a pamas is an ∞×n−matrix, where the columns
correspond to the players and the rows to the fuzzy coalitions. In each row t
there is a core element of the game vt. The participation monotonicity condi-
tion implies that, if the scheme is used as regulator for the payoﬀ distributions
in the restricted fuzzy games, players are paid per unit of participation more
in larger coalitions than in smaller coalitions.
Remark 8 Note that the collection of participation monotonic allocation
schemes of a fuzzy game v is a convex set of ∞ × n−matrices.
Remark 9 In Tsurumi et al. (2001) inspired by Sprumont (1990), the no-
tion of fuzzy population monotonic allocation scheme (FPMAS) is introduced.
The relation between such a scheme and core elements is not studied there.
Remark 10 A necessary condition for the existence of a pamas for v is the
existence of core elements for vt for each t ∈ FN. But this is not suﬃcient
as Example 8 shows. A suﬃcient condition is the convexity of a game as we
see in Theorem 10.
Example 8 Consider the game v ∈ FG N,w h e r eN = {1,2,3,4} and v(s)=
min{s1 + s2,s 3 + s4}. Suppose for a moment that [at,i]t∈FN,i∈N is a pamas.













k∈N atk,k =4> 2=v
¡
eN¢
, and this implies that there
does not exist a pamas. Note that C (vt) 6= ∅ for each t ∈ FN, because
(t1,t 2,0,0) ∈ C (vt) if t1 + t2 ≤ t3 + t4;a n d(0,0,t 3,t 4) ∈ C (vt) otherwise.
Deﬁnition 4 Let v ∈ FG N and x ∈ C(v).T h e nw ec a l lx pamas−
extendable if there exists a pamas [at,i]t∈FN,i∈N such that aeN,i = xi for each
i ∈ N.
In the next theorem we see that convex games have a pamas. Moreover,
each core element is pamas−extendable.
Theorem 10 Let v ∈ FG N be a convex game and let x ∈ C(v).T h e nx is
pamas−extendable.
Proof. We know from Theorem 7 that x is in the convex hull of the
marginal vectors mσ(v) with σ ∈ ΠN. In view of Remark 7 we only need to
prove that each marginal vector mσ(v) is pamas-extendable, because then the
right convex combination of these pamas extensions gives a pamas extension
of x.
So take σ ∈ ΠN and deﬁne [at,i]t∈FN,i∈N by at,i = mσ
i (vt) for each t ∈ FN,
i ∈ N. We claim that this scheme is a pamas extension of mσ(v).
Clearly, aeN,i = mσ
i (v) for each i ∈ N since v
¡
eN¢
= v.F u r t h e r , b y
Remark 5, each t−restricted game vt is a convex game, and from Theorem
7 it follows that (at,i)i∈N ∈ C(vt). Hence the scheme satisﬁes the stability
condition.
To prove the participation monotonicity condition, take s,t ∈ FN with
s ≤ t and i ∈ supp(s) and let k be the element in N such that i = σ(k).W e
have to prove that t
−1
i at,i ≥ s
−1
i as,i.N o w
t
−1


















































where the inequality follows from the convexity of v (Proposition 5). So
[at,i]t∈FN,i∈N is a pamas extension of mσ(v).





t∈FN,i∈N with the fuzzy Shapley value of the restricted
game vt in each row t, is a pamas. For a study of a Shapley function in
relation with FPMAS we refer to Tsurumi et al. (2001).
Example 9 Let v ∈ FG {1,2} be given by v(s1,s 2)=4 s1(s1 − 2) + 10(s2)2.
Then v is convex and m(1,2)(v)=m(2,1)(v)=φ(v)=( −4,10) because in fact
v is additive: v(s1,s 2)=v(s1,0)+v(0,s 2).F o re a c ht ∈ FN the fuzzy Shapley
value φ(vt) equals (4t1(t1 − 2),10(t2)2), and the scheme [at,i]t∈FN,i∈{1,2} with
at,1 =4 t1(t1 − 2), at,2 = 10(t2)2 is a pamas extension of φ(v), with the fuzzy
Shapley value of vt in each row t of the scheme, so [at,i]t∈FN,i∈{1,2} is the total
fuzzy Shapley value of v.
6C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
Game theoretic approaches to cooperative situations in fuzzy environments
have given rise to several types of cooperative fuzzy games. We mention
here games with fuzzy coalitions and games with fuzzy coalition values. For
a survey see Nishizaki and Sakawa (2001). Our study concerns cooperative
games with fuzzy coalitions. We study in this paper the cone of convex fuzzy
22games that lies in the cone of cooperative fuzzy games with a participation
monotonic allocation scheme. Convex fuzzy games have an interesting large
core, where each element is pamas−extendable, and where the fuzzy Shapley
values of the game and its restricted games form a pamas. In the theory of
cooperative crisp games this pamas corresponds to the population monotonic
allocation rule, known as the total Shapley value. For convex crisp games
there is another interesting population monotonic allocation rule, namely the
pmas-extension of the egalitarian rule of Dutta and Ray (Hokari, 2000). It
would be interesting to ﬁnd such an egalitarian rule for convex fuzzy games,
too. Another goal for further research could be to ﬁnd a subclass of convex
fuzzy games, where the diagonal values of the game and its restricted games
lead to a pamas.
Also other solutions could be developed and/or studied for convex fuzzy
games, e.g. those corresponding to solutions such as: stable set, kernel and
bargaining set for cooperative crisp games.
To ﬁnd variants of convex fuzzy games when other types of fuzziness are
considered, seems to be another interesting direction for future research.
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